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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein the 
Plaintiffs sought an adjudication in regard to the respective 
powers of the Municipal Council and of the Mayor under the 
council-mayor optional form of municipal government. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a declaratory judgment 
holding that the mayor has only the powers specifically granted 
him by statute and that all other powers, including the execu-
tive powers not specifically granted to the mayor, are vested 
in the municipal council. 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant seeks an adjudication by 
this court that under the statutes of the State of Utah in 
a municipal government organized and established under the 
optional form known as the council-mayor form, all executive 
power is vested in the mayor and all legislative power in the 
municipal council. The appellant also seeks reversal of the 
trial court's ruling in regard to specific matters where such 
rulings are based on erroneous decisions as to the scope of 
the mayor's power. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The 1975 session of the Legislature of the State 
of Utah enacted the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, 
Act of March 12, 1975, Ch. 33, § 1 et. seq. (1975], Laws of 
Utah 106 (repealed 1977) [hereinafter cited as the 1975 
Optional Forms Act]. In the spring of 1975, citizens of 
Logan, Utah, took steps to initiate an election to determine 
whether or not the city should adopt the council-mayor form 
of government as provided for by the 1975 Optional Forms Act, 
§ 10 (1975), in place of the traditional conunission form of 
government which had theretofore been in effect. In an election 
1 
held July 1, 1975, the new form of government was approved to 
become effective on the 5th day of January, 1976. The Mayor, 
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having two years left to run on his elected term, carried over 
from the commission form into the new mayor-council form of 
government. Five new councilmembers were elected in the 
municipal election in the fall of 1975. 
Within the first year of the operation under the 
new form of government, a dispute arose between the Mayor and 
three of the members of the municipal council as to the extent 
of the Mayor's authority under the new form of government. 
Three of the councilmembers took the position that the Mayor 
had only those powers specifically delegated to him by statute 
while all other municipal powers, both legislative and adminis-
trative, were vested in the municipal council. The Mayor and 
two of the oouncilmembers took the position that all of the 
executive power was vested in the Mayor and all of the legis-
lative power in the council. That same division of opinion 
still persists. The three councilmembers that sought to 
restrict the Mayor's power were the parties Plaintiff in this 
action below, while the other two councilmembers who agreed 
with the Mayor in interpreting the scope of his power have 
appeared as amicus curiae in this case in support of the 
Appellant's position. 
nl The principal points of contention between the 
Appellant and the opposing councilmembers have to do with the 
Mayor's authority to manage city property -- specifically to 
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buy and sell property -- and with the Mayor's authority to 
make budget adjustments after the council has adopted a budget. 
The Mayor's position was that the new council-mayor form vested , 
in him exclusive authority over all specific property trans-
actions, their being administrative acts exercisable only by 
the Mayor as executive within the new separate powers municipal 
government. The municipal council was of the view that, since 
Utah statutes did not expressly grant real property authority 
to the Mayor, he could not enter into specific transactions 
without council approval. The council also urged that all such 
transaction already effected by the Mayor alone were void, 
subject to rescission. Obviously, a resolution of this dispute 
is a central aim of this appeal. 
A dispute also arose below as to the obligation of 
the Mayor to provide information to the council. The Mayor 
took the position below that in the absence of a specific 
resolution or ordinance by the council, his obligation 
under the statutes to report to the council was to report 
on the state of the city in the time and form in which he 
chose to report. On the other hand, one councilmember, f 
the Plaintiff Larson, demanded that the Mayor search the records,i 
compile and make copies of certain documents and deliver them 
to him. This the Mayor declined to do but did not contest the 
right of the Plaintiff Larson to examine the documents in 
question and to make copies for himself. While this appears tc 
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be a rather petty argument, it shows the extent to which 
differing interpretations of the parties' respective powers 
and duties disrupted city governance and underscores the need 
for a definitive ruling on these questions from this court. 
During the evidentiary hearing on the case, it 
developed that there was no dispute between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant as to some of the claims for relief set forth in 
the complaint. In regard to the third claim for relief, both 
sides agreed that the Mayor could make intra-departmental 
budget transfers without council approval but could not make 
inter-departmental transfers without such approval.' The court 
held that there was one incident of an inter-departmental 
transfer made by the Mayor without council approval. Appellant 
is unable to identify any evidence substantiating this holding, 
but in view of the fact that both sides agree as to the general 
principle, there seems to be no need for declaratory relief on 
this particular issue. 
However, the court held below that even in case of 
an intra-departmental transfer, the Mayor cannot use funds 
from a specifically budgeted-for item to purchase a different 
object even in cases of need, without council approval, but 
may only readjust uncommitted funds. The Mayor, on the other 
hand, contends that within a department, specific mention of 
particular items to be purchased are advisory only and that 
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the Mayor with the consent of the Budget Officer may transfer 
funds which are recommended for the purchase of a road grader, 
for example, to the purchase of an automobile or even to the 
employment of additional personnel, as the city's needs indicate. 
In regard to the Fourth Claim for Relief, The Approval 
of Subdivisions, Appellant agrees that while the approval and 
recording of subdivision plats is in the nature of an executive 
action, because of the peculiar wording of the state statute, 
this power rests with the council. However, it is the position 
of the Appellant that a valid delegation of such authority to 
the Mayor was made by the council, by ordinance. (Record, p. 24l·il 
In regard to the Fifth Claim for Relief, Appeilant 
agrees that the council may spend city funds for the prosecu-
tion of this action to determine their rights and duties. On 
the other hand, appellant questions the right of the council 
to use city funds to pay for legal services to set aside con-
surmnated real estate transactions made by the Mayor. Both 
sides agree, however, that the resolution of this matter depends: 
upon the resolution of the main question in this action, namely, 
did the Mayor have the right to make the real estate sales 
and purchases? 
The Seventh Claim for Relief was dismissed by 
stipulation. 
' 
_....... 
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Therefore, this case distills to a determination 
of the following issues: 
1. Does the alternate council-mayor form of 
government create a true separate-powers government thereby 
vesting the whole of executive power in the Mayor? 
2. Is the management of city property, including 
the purchase and sale of property within budget limitations, 
an executive power? 
3. Is the decision to adjust committed funds from 
one item to another as the city's needs dictate an executive 
power and, therefore, not subject to the specific departmental 
budget recommendations made by the municipal council? 
4. What is the extent of the Mayor's obligation 
to assemble information for individual councilmernbers? 
It is the position of the Appellant that the factual 
situation was not sufficiently clear for the court below to 
have granted summary judgment on several of the points 
covered in the first order. However, the factual situation 
is sufficiently clear at the present time as a result of the 
later evidentiary hearing to enable this court and counsel to 
delineate the basic issues presented by this case. Appellant, 
therefore, will not press on appeal the question of the propriety 
of the summary judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 1977 ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF MUNICIPAL GOVERN-
MENT ACT GOVERNS ALL GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS IN 
A CITY ADOPTING A COUNCIL-MAYOR FORM OF GOVERN-
MENT AND PROVIDES FOR A COMPLETE SEPARATION OF 
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWER. 
It is Appellant's position that Utah's legislature 
intended the optional council-mayor form of municipal govern-
ment established by the 1975 Optional Forms Act, as amended 
~Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1201, et seq. (Supp. 1977), to be 
patterned after the federal and state separate-power models. 
See U.S. Const., art. I. §I, art. II §1; Utah Const., art. V 
§1. The point of departure in any analysis of a particular 
type of governmental power is the organic law that creates 
the government itself. In the case of the federal and state 
governments, this creating body of law consists of these 
respective constitutions. In the case of the municipal model, 1 
state statutes are the creating law. 
Initially, the state's legislature determines that 
the needs of the citizenry would be served by smaller, more 
localized, units of social order. Thus state statutes create 
municipalities -- new "governments" albiet in an abstract 
sense. (Utah Code Ann., §10-1-201 (Supp. 1977), repealing, 
§10-7-1 (1953)). 
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Since these municipal governments cannot serve the 
needs of their respective populaces unless they are vested 
with the ability to act in concrete ways, the state legislature 
next determines what actions these governments must be able 
to take. Having determined that it will further the general 
welfare if municipal governments are able to maintain order, 
to regulate conduct, and to provide for the needs of their 
citizens as they arise, the state legislature acts to grant 
these entities the specific power to do so. Obviously, when 
the legislature undertakes to grant the municipal government 
power to act, it grants the whole of that power -- both its 
legislative and its administrative components. This general 
vesting of the power in municipal government to act as an 
entity is reflected in Chapter B of Title 10 of the 1953 Utah 
Code, entitled "Powers and Duties of All Cities." This body 
of legislation operates as a general grant of the power to 
act as a government to municipalities. 
Section 10-8-2 of the Code empowers the municipal 
government to: 
purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, 
convey and dispose of property real 
and personal for the benefit of the 
city .... 
This legislation only grants the governmental entity the 
specified power -- it says nothing about the manner of its 
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exercise. Nor does the statute attempt to separate the 
power to manage city property into its legislative or ad.min-
istrative components. Again, the statute simply vests the 
"whole" power over city property in the municipal governmental 
unit. 
Having created the municipal unit of government and 
having vested it with power over its property and citizens, 
the state legislature then specifies the form under which the 
new governmental entity will operate. Utah municipalities 
have traditionally governed through a single body. Sometimes 
the body was referred to as the "City Council," or "City Commissij 
and sometimes as the "governing body. " There has" not tradi tiona::i. 
been any provision for a separation of legislative from execu-
tive powers. See Utah Code Ann., §10-6-1 to 3 (1953), repealed 
by §10-1-114 (Supp. 1977), repealing, §10-6-35 (1975). Even 
under the 1977 Optional Forms Act, one of the two optional forms 1 
provided for -- the council-manager form continues to vest 
both executive and legislative functions in a single body. 
Although Utah cities were, prior to the 1975 Optional 
Forms Act, authorized to operate via a mayor and city council 
or via city commission alone, the council or commission was 
the part of the city government that held all of the "government; 
power. Where there was a mayor, he was simply an administrator, 
having no vote on policy matters, and no veto. See Utah Code .1\Jlf:· 
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§10-6-24 (1953), repealed, §10-1-114 (Supp. 1977). Thus, 
while the traditional city mayor might be said to have been 
a part of municipal government, he held no municipal govern-
mental power, this having been vested in the council by virtue 
of the statutorily specified form of its exercise. In other 
words, prior to 1975, the whole of governmental power, both 
executive and legislative, was vested in city councils and 
boards of commission simply because that was the only statutorily 
allowed means of exercising municipal government power. 
In 1975, however, the state legislature saw fit to 
provide an alternative to all Utah cities. This Act did not 
alter the existence of local governments, nor did it expand 
or contract the scope of the power vested in these units of 
government. 1975 Optional Forms Act, §6. What it did was to 
provide new forms for the exercise of this governmental power 
because: 
increasingdemandsfor services and growing 
citizen awareness and concern [had] strained 
the ability of Utah's local governments to 
respond effectively [and there was therefore] 
a need to provide optional forms of municipal 
government under which citizens may vote to 
organize to meet their needs and desires. 
Id. §4, U.C.A. §10-6-112 (1975) repealed, §10-1-114 (Supp. 1977). 
One of the alternatives created to meet these new 
demands was the council-mayor form. This change in form 
affected municipal governments in two ways. First, it vested 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-12-
the mayor with governmental power formerly reserved exclusively 
to councils and to commissions, 1975 Optional Forms Act, §10. 
Second, it divided this vested governmental power into its 
executive and legislative components for the first time. See 
Id., §21. 
Unfortunately, the state legislature assumed that 
it would be clear that this new council-mayor form was to be 
patterned after the state and federal separate-powers govern-
ments. Because this was not made explicit, the 1977 legislature ( 
added the following clarifications: 
§10-3-101. Each municipality shall have 
a governing body which shall exercise the 
legislative and executive powers of the 
municipalityl:i:Illess the municipality is 
organized with separate executive and 
legislative branches of government. 
§10-3-1209. The optional form of govern-
ment known as the council-mayor form vests 
the government of a municipality which 
adopts this form in two separate, indepen-
dent and equal branches of municipal 
government; the executive branch consisting 
of a mayor and the administrative depart-
ments and officers; and the legislative 
branch consisting of a municipal council. 
(Emphasis added) 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, Utah Code Ann., 
et ~· (Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as the 1977 Optional 
Forms Act]. 
§lO·j 
I 
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The court below recognized that the 1977 Act 
was merely a more explicit statement of the intent of the 
1975 Act when it stated in its final declaratory summary 
judgment: 
The functions of the council embodied in 
this section are retained in Section 
10-3-1201 of Senate Bill 204, but it does 
eliminate the phrase that the municipal 
council is the governing body. However, 
the functions and duties of the council 
and the functions and duties of the 
mayors are not substantially changed and 
remain basically the same. (R. p. 440). 
Finally, therefore, the Utah State Legislature has 
created a means by which a municipality can exercise its 
governmental powers that is completely in accord with the 
federal and state models. Clearly, this new optional form 
modifies the literal language of Chapter 8 of Title 10 of the 
Utah Code. Now the "Powers and Duties of all Cities," vest 
in city councils exclusively, only in cases where the tradi-
tional governmental forms are retained. Where the new, 
optional council-mayor form is implemented, the whole of 
governmental powers vests in both the mayor and the municipal 
council. But, again consistent with the federal and state 
prototypes, the power is divided. The whole of the executive 
power now vests exclusively in the mayor. The whole of the 
legislative power now vests exclusively in the municipal council. 
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The 1977 Optional Forms Act is relatively short. 
The legislature did not attempt to revise all of the municipal 
statutes to make them applicable to the new council-mayor 
form of government nor to specifically explain the effect of 
the new Act on their interpretation. Rather, it provided in 
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1205, (Supp. 1977): 
Any municipality operating under this 
part shall retain and have the right, 
powers and duties now or hereafter 
granted to municipalities of the same 
class and those rights, powers and duties 
which could be granted the municipalities 
of the same class. 
Therefore, those statutes creating municipalities 
and granting them corporate powers apply fully to the new 
form. The interpretation of those statutes, however, with 
respect to the manner of the exercise of those governmental 
powers is modified by the division of power established by 
the new council-mayor form. In short, where the general 
municipal laws are consistent with the council-mayor form, 
they are to be literally applied. Where they are not consis-
tent, they are superseded and modified to the extent of the 
incompatability. 
The difficulty in this case arises principally 
from the fact that the general municipal law frequently pro-
vides that all municipal governmental power is vested in the 
"governing body" or in the city council or board of corrunissioner: 
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To repeat for emphasis, these provisions were all designed 
to apply to a form of government where the executive and 
legislative powers were vested in a single "governing body." 
However, the term "governing body" ceases to have any meaning 
in a mayor-council form because there is no longer such a 
single entity. Indeed, as was shown above, the statutes vest-
ing governmental power in any single body are completely 
modified as applied to this new, separate-powers form of 
government. 
Despite the explicit language contained in the 
1977 Optional Forms Act, and the logical modification the Act 
has had on the general municipal statutes, Respondents continue 
to maintain that some inherent part of the executive power 
resides in the municipal council. This position is taken in 
the memoranda submitted to the trial court by counsel for the 
Respondents and during oral argument before the trial court. 
At the time of the evidentiary hearings, counsel for the 
Respondents stated: 
We think, your Honor, that there is a 
question and that is a very important 
question, we think that, as Mr. Rampton 
framed it here, it is in part a 
question and fundamentally a question 
as to whether any administrative powers 
reside in the Council or whether they 
are in fact only and solely a legisla-
tive body. (Tr. p. 130) 
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In spite of the fact that the law now specifically 
provides that there is no governing body under the council-mayor 
form of government and that the intent of the law clearly is 
that the whole of executive power shall be vested in the 
mayor and only the legislative powers in the council, the trial 
court agreed with Respondents and held that the general powers 
of the municipality, both legislative and executive, reside in 
the council except where specifically by statute, e.g. Utah 
Code Ann. §10-3-1219 (Supp. 1977), they are granted the mayor. 
Appellant has shown, however, that the question of 
who is vested with what specific power is not a question of 
statutory provision, but is, as in all separate-powers 
governments, a question of whether the power is executive or 
legislative in nature. The distinction between executive· and 
legislative powers and functions is elaborated below. Never-
theless, it bears noting here that in the case of property 
transactions, the mayor in this new form has power over specific 
sales, exchanges, leases and purchases. The council, subject 
always to mayoral veto, has exclusive power over the amount of 
monies to be spent and over the general policies that broadly 
govern all transactions. The same holds true of budget matters. 
The council's exclusive province is to fix the total depart-
mental budget and amounts. The mayor has the exclusive power 
J 
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to make adjustments within the budgets as the need arises. 
No other interpretation is consistent with the distinction 
between legislative and executive functions as established 
by this court. 
The court below ruled that Logan's municipal council 
has "exclusive" power over all aspects of city real property 
transactions (Record, p. 441). This property issue alone 
warrants this court's reversal and clarification of the rule 
of law applied. 
Appellant has shown that the council-mayor form of 
municipal government in the context of which this action arose 
is a true separate-powers form of government. Appellant will 
establish below that the acts he took with respect to real 
property transactions were clearly executive and administrative 
and not legislative within the rule established by this court. 
It necessarily follows, therefore, that the lower court's 
decision constitutes an impermissible violation of the funda-
mental separation of the powers of municipal government established 
by the citizens of Logan City. 
This court has been adamant in its refusal to condone 
violations of the separation of governmental powers established 
by the Utah State Constitution. In Rampton v. Barlow, 23 U.2d 
383, 464 P.2d 378 (1970), this court struck down an attempt by 
the state legislature to infringe on the governor's power of 
appointment. 
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It may be stated then, as a general rule 
inherent in the American constitutional system, 
that, unless otherwise expressly provided or 
incidental to the powers conferred, the legis-
lature cannot exercise either executive or 
judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise 
either executive or legislative power. The 
existence in the various constitutions of occa-
sional provisions expressly giving to one of 
the departments powers which by their nature 
otherwise would fall within the general scope 
of the authority of another department emphasizes, 
rather than casts doubt upon, the generally 
inviolate character of this basic rule. 
Legislative power, as distinguished from 
executive power, is the authority to make laws, 
but not to enforce them or appoint the agents 
charged with the duty of such enforcement. The 
latter are executive functions ...• 
464 P.2d at 381, quoting with approval, Springer v. Philippine 
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928). Cf. Taylor v. Lee, 
226 P.2d 531, 534-37 (1951). 
Since the optional council-mayor form was intended 
by the legislature to function as does the state model, it 
follows that this court should be as sensitive to violations 
of the separation of powers in the former case as it is in 
the latter. Indeed, if this court does not apply the same 
standards to this new separate-powers form of municipal govern-
ment that it does to its state counterpart, it will itself 
have violated the separation of judicial from legislative 
functions fixed by Article V of the Utah Constitution. For 
if this court approves the lower court's decision, it will 
have judicially repealed the Optional Forms of Municipal 
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Governments Act. This court will have declared that there 
are no options of government available to municipalities 
and that all Utah cities are once again relegated to the old 
system of governance exclusively by a single body the city 
council or commission. 
POINT II 
THE AUTHORITY TO MANAGE CITY PROPERTY, INCLUD-
ING THE POWER TO SELL AND -- WITHIN BUDGETARY 
LIMITS -- TO PURCHASE IS AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION. 
It is the Respondents' position in this case that 
the authority to manage city property and to purchase and sell 
property is vested exclusively in the municipal council. This 
is based upon the language in the general municipal statutes 
that such authority is granted to the city council or board 
of commissioners. Appellant has already established, however, 
that these general municipal statutes do not literally apply 
to the alternate council-mayor form. Rather the general statutes 
now vest these powers in the mayor and in the council. The 
specific manner of exercise, in this case who shall enter into 
specific real estate transactions, now depends solely on 
whether the action is an executive or a legislative function. 
It is obvious that there will be few cases directly 
on this point for the reason that substantially all of the 
cases delineating the power of municipal councils or commissions 
are concerned with the structure of municipal government where 
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the executive and legislative are combined in a single body. 
It is possible, however, to approach this matter on the basis 
of court decisions applying to state government where there 
is a clear division of powers, as the Appellant has shown 
there is under the council-mayor form of municipal government. 
Considerable light is shed on this subject from cases inter-
preting the referendum laws as they apply to municipal 
governments. 
Even though legislative and executive functions are 
combined in the conventional forms of municipal government, 
laws of most states, including the State of Utah, have been 
interpreted to hold that only municipal governmental action 
of a legislative nature may be the subject of a referendum, 
while actions of an executive-administrative nature are exempt 
from provisions of the referendum law. This principle is 
firmly established in the State of Utah by the case of 
Keigley, et al. v. Bench, City Recorder, 97 Utah 69, 89 P.2d 
480 (1939). Following Keigley, other Utah cases have made a 
determination under the referendum laws in regard to particular 
matters in determining whether such matters were legislative 
or executive in character. 
One case that is very helpful in this regard is 
the case of Bird v. Sorenson, 16 U.2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964). 
In that case, the City of Washington Terrace in Weber county 
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had in effect a master zoning plan ordinance which had been 
properly adopted by the city council. Thereafter, the council, 
by ordinance, changed a specific piece of property from one 
classification to another. An attempt was made to submit the 
latter specific ordinance to the people under the referendum 
law. This court held that the ordinance assigning the specific 
piece of property to a specific classification was an admin-
istrative and not a legislative matter and that therefore the 
ordinance was not subject to the referendum provisions. Id. 
The similarity to this case is obvious. In Bird the 
act establishing the zoning classifications and providing for 
the restrictions which would apply to each classification was 
legislative in character. Assigning a specific piece of 
property to a specific classification,on the other hand, was 
executive in character. In this case, Appellant agrees that 
the council had full legislative authority to prescribe by 
ordinance general rules to be followed by the executive branch 
in purchasing or selling property. They could, for example, 
have provided procedures for the giving of notice and the taking 
of bids. However, a determination that Tract A should be sold 
by the city to John Doe is not a legislative act; it is an 
executive act. It is final and binding upon the city as being 
done by the executive in the manner prescribed by the general 
law. 
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There are several cases from other jurisdictions 
which support this position. In the Oregon case of Monahan v. 
Funk, 137 Ore. 589, 3 P.2d 778 (1931), the council authorized 
the purchase of a specific piece of real property to be used 
by the City of Portland for a crematory site. An effort was 
made to cause the ordinance to be submitted to a referendum. 
The court held that the ordinance directing the purchase of a 
specific piece of property was administrative in nature and 
was therefore not subject to referendum. The following language 
from the court is helpful in this regard: 
The act of purchasing a parcel of real 
estate is no more legislative than the 
act of purchasing a fire engine and 
truck. It is not the enactment of a 
permanent law for the guidance of the 
citizens of Portland. [citation omitted] 
When the city of Portland receives 
the title to the land described in the 
ordinance and pays the purchase price 
thereof, the ordinance in question will 
practically be defunct. It prescribes 
no rule of civil conduct; it is not 
permanent, uniform, or universal in its 
application to the general public. It 
was a carrying out of the business of 
the council by giving authority to the 
commissioner of public utilities for con-
venience in effecting the transaction. 
Id. at 780. 
In the Kansas case, State ex rel Frank v. Salome, 
167 Kan. 766, 208 P.2d 198 (1949), the Board of Commissioners 
of the City of Wichita passed a resolution granting a right 
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of way for a flood control project to the Army Corps of 
Engineers. An attempt was made to submit the matter to 
referendum. The court held that the ordinance was not one 
of general application, but was one applying to a specific 
piece of property and was enacted to carry out general policy 
and, therefore, was executive in nature and not subject to 
referendum. 
An annotation on this subject is found at 122 A.L.R. 
776 (1939). The general holding of that part of the annota-
tion entitled "Acquisitions of Property by Municipalities" and 
the cases there cited, is that the acquisition of specific 
pieces of property, even though directed by ordinance in the 
case of a council or commission having both legislative and 
executive powers, is an act administrative in nature rather 
than legislative and therefore not subject to referendum. 
A case directly in point involving the management 
of public property as applied to state government is a South 
Carolina case, Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 
44 S.E.2d 88 (S.C. 1947). In that case, the legislature 
created an auditorium district and provided that two members 
of the legislature should sit on the board of trustees which 
managed such district properties. The court in declaring such 
provisions unconstitutional, stated: 
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An enlightening discussion of the 
quoted provision is found in Spartanburg 
County v. Miller, 135 SC 348, 132 SE 673, 
677, where it was said: "As a general 
rule the Legislature of the state may not, 
consistently with the constitutional 
requirement here involved, undertake both 
to pass laws and to execute them by setting 
its own members to the task of discharging 
such functions by virtue of their offices 
as legislators, would seem to be self-
evident. The principle, as we apprehend, 
upon the correct application of which 
depends the solution of any such problem 
as to the exercise by the Legislature of 
nonlegislative functions, is that the 
Legislature may properly engage in the 
disch~rge of such functions to the extent, 
and to the extent only, that their per-
formance is reasonably incidental to the 
full and effective exercise of its legis-
lative powers." Paraphrasing the sentence 
which precedes this quotation from the 
opinion, it may be said that the members 
of the Legislature from Greenville County 
were elected for the purpose of making 
laws, not administering them. 
In 1976, the majority of the Logan municipal council 
expressed its recognition of the fact that the sale and 
purchase of property is an executive function not within the 
jurisdiction of the council. On the 16th day of September, 
the council amended the Logan City, Utah, Ordinances §17-3-3, 
to read as follows: 
(a) No real estate, except cemetery lots, 
may be sold, traded or purchased by the 
executive branch of city government unless 
and until said proposed sale, trade or 
purchase is presented to the Municipal 
Council for its information and suggestions, 
if any. 
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(b) The executive branch of government 
shall not lease any city real property for 
a term more than five years unless and 
until the proposed lease is presented to 
the Municipal Council for its information 
and suggestions, if any. 
(Defendant's Exhibit #8) 
While this ordinance was being discussed, one of the 
councilmembers moved to amend it to add the words "with Municipal 
Council approval." Such motion died for want of a second 
(Defendant's Exhibit #9). It appears, therefore, that the 
majority of the council clearly recognized the executive power 
to buy and sell property and were merely exercising the well-
established legislative function of legislative oversight. 
Under this principle, the legislature can review executive 
actions for the purpose of making possible decisions on future 
legislation, even though they do not have the power to approve 
or disapprove the action taken. 
The court below brushed aside the above ordinance 
by stating that the council could not delegate the power to 
buy and sell property to the administrative branch by inference, 
although it could by a direct delegation. In so holding, the 
trial court missed Appellant's point entirely. Appellant's 
contention was not that this assigned the power by implication; 
his position was, and is, that the power clearly resided in 
the executive branch and the adoption of the ordinance was a 
recognition of that fact. 
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POINT III 
THE POWER TO APPROVE SUBDIVISION PLANS HAS 
BEEN DELEGATED BY THE COUNCIL TO THE MAYOR. 
An anomalous situation arises in regard to the 
recordation of subdivision plans. This appears quite clearly 
to be an executive function. However, the statutory section 
covering the approval of subdivision plans, Utah Code Ann. 
§10-9-25, (1953) specifically provides that no subdivision 
plat may be recorded until the "legislative body has approved 
it and has noted its approval in writing on the plat itself." 
If the statute used the term "governing body" it would be 
Appellant's position, for the reasons heretofore stated, that 
the power was vested in the Mayor. However, as the statute 
specifically uses the term "legislative body" under the 
division of powers doctrine, this power of final approval 
undoubtedly is vested in the council. 
This in no way, however, argues against Appellant's 
general position that under the council-mayor form of govern-
ment the general executive powers are vested in the Mayor. 
In fact, it strengthens that position for the reasons set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Springer v. Philippine Islands: 1 
The existence in the various constitutions 
of occasional provisions expressly giving 
to one of the departments powers which by 
their nature otherwise would fall within 
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the general scope of the authority of 
another department emphasizes, rather than 
casts doubt upon, the generally inviolate 
character of this basic rule. 
277 U.S. at 202, 72 L.Ed at 849, quoted with approval in 
Rampton v. Barlow, supra, at 381. 
This matter becomes of importance in this case 
because the Mayor has been approving and having recorded plats 
for what are known as inner block and cluster developments, 
but which appear to be, in effect, subdivisions. The authority 
to take such actions has been delegated to the Mayor by 
§17-3-1 and §17-3-2 of the Logan City Ordinances. The complete 
text of these ordinances appear at R. p. 241-48. An examination 
of these ordinances, adopted on July 15th and July 20th, 1976, 
will clearly show that the municipal council delegated this 
final approval and recordation power to the Mayor, and properly 
accompanied this delegation with explicit and detailed guide-
lines as to the exercise of the delegated power. 
The trial court, however, held that, as the state 
statute specifically delegates to the "legislative body" the 
authority to approve subdivision plats, this function cannot 
be delegated. The matter of the delegation of legislative 
powers is the subject of a great body of law in this country. 
A full review of the cases is not required here. The general 
and almost uniformly accepted rule is that the legislative 
Power can be delegated by the legislature to an administrative 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-28-
body provided that the delegation is accompanied by suffi-
ciently definite guidelines to make certain that the admin-
istrators in exercising the delegated power are exercising 
it in accordance with the legislative intent. See Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 US 288, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1934). See 
also, Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 442, 211 P.2d 190, 
192-3 (1949); Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192 
P.2d 563, 467 (1948). The trial court erred, therefore, not 
in its holding that this power is assigned by statute to the 
council, but in its holding that it was not and could not be 
delegated to the Mayor even when accompanied by detailed 
guidelines. 
POINT IV 
THE BUDGET OFFICER, WITH THE APPROVAL OF 
THE MAYOR, MAY TRANSFER FUNDS WITHIN A 
DEPARTMENTAL BUDGET WITHOUT PRIOR MUNICI-
PAL COUNCIL APPROVAL. 
The Appellant, Respondents and the court below are 
all in agreement on the general principle with regard to 
budgetary transfers. The problem comes, however, in regard 
to the specific application of the principles. Budgeting in 
all municipalities is governed by the Uniform Municipal Fiscal ' 
Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. §10-10-46 (1953) provides as 
follows: 
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With the consent of the budget officer, 
the head of any department may transfer 
any unencwnbered or unexpended appro-
priation balance or any portion thereof 
from one expenditure account to another 
within the department during the budget 
year, or an excess expenditure of one or 
more line items may be permitted by any 
department head with the consent of the 
budget officer, provided the total of 
all excess expenditures or encwnbrances 
do not exceed total unused appropriations 
within the department at the close of the 
budget year. 
Although the quoted section refers to "line items," 
nowhere in the Code is this defined. Frequently, within a 
departmental budget, certain capital items which the legislature 
intends shall be purchased, are listed as units going to make 
up the total of the departmental budget. The question is 
whether those individual listings, or the composite total of 
the departmental appropriation are what is meant by the term 
"line item." Counsel has found no case law that is helpful 
on this point. However, it may be helpful to have reference 
to the appropriation acts of the State of Utah for illustrative 
purposes. A good example is the appropriation for the Department 
of Development Services, Act of February 28, 1975, Ch. 213, 
Item 51 (1975] Laws of Utah 1025. The entire appropriation to 
the department is included in line item 51. It is clear that 
the department head, or the Governor, cannot transfer money 
from item 51 to item 52. However, within item 51, even though 
there are listed 6 specific schedules of programs with a dollar 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-30-
figure after each one, the department head with the consent 
of the Governor may transfer funds from one program to another. 
For example, they may transfer money from library to mansion 
maintenance. 
Comparing this with the budget documents of Logan 
City, Plaintiff's Exhibit #14, it would appear that the designa· 
ti on of specific dollars for specific uni ts within a departmenta: 
I 
budget are advisory only and are used for the purpose of 
constructing the budget, as with the case of the schedule of 
programs under state appropriation acts, but are subject to 
modification by the budget officer and the department head 
as operations during the year may indicate that good manage-
ment necessitates some transfer within a department. 
For example, let us suppose that $4500 is indicated 
in the budget request for the purchase of a passenger automobile., 
Does that mean that the passenger automobile must be purchased 
for $4500, no more, no less? Certainly, if it were purchased 
for less than the $4500, by the specific authorization of Utah 
Code Ann. §10-10-46 (1953), the amount not used could be 
transferred for another purpose within the department. Suppose 
that during the operation of the department during the year 
the passenger automobile which was to be replaced by the new 
I 
car held up better than expected, but a truck which was believeci 
to have been in good condition broke down. Can the department ! 
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head, with the approval of the budget officer, spend the 
money instead for a truck, or must he proceed to purchase 
the passenger automobile? It should be obvious that the 
exigencies of governance require that the administrative 
department have considerable latitude in adjusting funds, 
provided it does not go over the amount appropriated and 
provided it does not attempt to transfer funds from one 
department to another. 
The Logan City Auditor, who was called as a witness 
by the Plaintiffs, testified that since implementation of the 
new government, budgetary procedures, including the transfer 
of funds, have been conducted exactly as they have been con-
ducted over the past several years (Tr. 110). With that pre-
cedent, Appellant submits that state law allows the head of 
the department, with the permission of the budget officer, to 
transfer funds within a departmental budget, notwithstanding 
the fact that there may have been an indication within the 
departmental budget that at the time of the construction of 
the budget certain funds were intended for certain specific 
purposes. 
POINT V 
THE MAYOR HAS NO OBLIGATION TO ASSEMBLE DATA AND 
DELIVER IT TO AN INDIVIDUAL COUNCILMEMBER ON DEMAND. 
The evidence in the case shows that at no time did 
the Mayor deny councilman Larson access to the city records, 
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with the right to inspect the same and make his own copies. 
The Mayor merely declined to research voluminous city records, 
assemble the copies and deliver them himself to the Councilman. 
It does not appear that there was any violation of the law 
by either side here and the court below did not specifically 
find that there was, despite an inference from the Memorandum 
Opinion to the contrary. Counsel, therefore, will not burden 
this court with this rather petty matter, except to re-emphasize' 
the extent to which a clarification of the respective powers 
and duties of the principals in the new council-mayor form is 
needed to prevent disruptions of city government and to effect 
the intent of the state legislature. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COUNCIL 
COULD EXPEND CITY FUNDS FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
TO SET ASIDE PAST SALES OF REAL PROPERTY 
EXECUTED BY THE MAYOR. 
The court held that the council could use city 
funds to hire an attorney to set aside certain real estate 
transactions which the council alleged were made without 
authority. At the evidentiary hearing on the matter, both 
sides agreed (Tr. 9-11) that the correctness of this holding 
would depend upon the correctness of the lower court's 
holding as to the Mayor's power to manage city property. 
Therefore, if Appellant prevails in regard to the main issue 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-33-
in this case, it follows that the finding of the court regard-
ing the payment of attorney's fees in cases to set aside real 
property transactions should be reversed. Appellant does not 
question the right of the Respondents to employ and pay for 
out of city funds counsel to conduct the case now before the 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel recognizes that it is the function of this 
court to decide specific cases rather than to issue broad 
proclamations of law. However, we would fail in our duty to 
this court if we did not point out that the decision in this 
case will have application far beyond the particular actions 
which gave rise to this case. It will have application far 
beyond Logan City, because this is the first case to reach 
this court and perhaps any court of final jurisdiction in 
this country defining powers and duties between the executive 
and the legislative branches in a municipality that operates 
under a division of powers system of government rather than 
under a council or conunission having joint legislative and 
executive authority. Presumably, if this proves to be a 
viable form, Logan will be followed by other cities and towns 
in the State of Utah. The court's decision in this case will 
become a landmark in the field of municipal governmental law. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of January, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By~=--.,---=---=,.----:-~~~~~~~ Calvin L. Rampton 
By 
~S-u_z_a_n_n_e~~M~.-=D~a~l~l.....,..im~o-r-e~~~~~~ 
Attorneys for Appellant Desmond 
L. Anderson 
J. Blaine Zollinger, City Attorney 
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